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R. Anthony Reese*

INTRODUCTION
In this Essay, I want to explore in more depth the precise nature of the
relationship between a copyright owner’s exclusive right to prepare derivative
works based on her copyrighted work and the inquiry into transformativeness that
informs the determination of whether an unconsented use of a copyrighted work is
a fair use and therefore noninfringing. I hope that better understanding this
relationship might help clarify the nature of the transformativeness inquiry in fair
use analysis, as well as how that inquiry does or does not affect the derivative work
right. I conduct this exploration by studying all of the relevant appellate court
opinions to see whether courts treat the fair use and derivative work issues as
related, and if so how. I conclude that appellate courts do not view fair use
transformativeness as connected with any transformation involved in preparing a
derivative work, and that in evaluating transformativeness the courts focus more on
the purpose of a defendant’s use than on any alteration the defendant has made to
the content of the plaintiff’s work.
I.

THE POTENTIAL OVERLAP BETWEEN TRANSFORMATIVENESS
AND THE DERIVATIVE WORK RIGHT

A. TRANSFORMATION IN FAIR USE AND THE DERIVATIVE WORK DEFINITION
Copyright law grants copyright owners certain exclusive rights in their works,
including the right to prepare “derivative works” based on their works. Those
rights, however, are expressly limited by the fair use doctrine: any use of a work
that qualifies as a fair use does not infringe on the work’s copyright. Section 107
of the Copyright Act instructs courts that in determining whether a particular use is
fair, they should consider four non-exclusive factors. In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc., the Supreme Court, in analyzing the statute’s first fair use factor (“the
purpose and character of the use”), said that:
The central purpose of this investigation is to see, in Justice Story’s words, whether
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the new work merely “supersede[s] the objects’” of the original creation, or instead
adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first
with new expression, meaning, or message; it asks, in other words, whether and to
what extent the new work is “transformative.”1

The “transformative” nature of the defendant’s use has thus become a major part
of fair use analysis, given the Court’s view that transformative uses “lie at the heart
of the fair use doctrine’s guarantee of breathing space within the confines of
copyright, and the more transformative the new work, the less will be the
significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding
of fair use.”2
The rise of transformativeness as an explicit, and important, aspect of fair use
analysis obviously has potential implications for the copyright owner’s exclusive
right, granted in section 106(2) of the Copyright Act, to prepare derivative works
based on her copyrighted work, since derivative works seem, by definition, to
involve some transformation of the underlying work. The current statute defines a
“derivative work” as “a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a
translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture
version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other
form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.”3 The illustrative
examples are for the most part works that involve some change in, or
transformation of, the preexisting work (though the degree of change may vary
among the listed categories of works, as well as among the actual works within any
listed category). And the final residual clause of the definition emphasizes the
connection between transformation and the creation of derivative works: “any other
form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.”
Commentators have worried that the emphasis that Campbell placed on
transformativeness in fair use analysis will affect the scope of the copyright
owner’s derivative work right to control forms in which her work is transformed.4
Since most derivative works within the scope of the copyright owner’s derivative
work right generally involve transformation of the underlying work, if that act of
transformation itself weighs in favor of fair use, then most derivative works will
have a stronger case for fair use.5 As a result, weighing transformation of a
copyrighted work in favor of fair use could potentially mean that many ordinary
derivative works, which would generally be within the copyright owner’s exclusive

1. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (internal citations omitted).
2. Id. at 579 (internal citation omitted).
3. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (defining “derivative work”).
4. See, e.g., Ruth Okediji, Givers, Takers, and Other Kinds of Users: A Fair Use Doctrine for
Cyberspace, 53 FLA. L. REV. 107, 126-27 (2001); Jeremy Kudon, Form Over Function: Expanding the
Transformative Use Test for Fair Use, 80 B.U. L. REV. 579, 592-93 (2000); Jane C. Ginsburg,
Copyright and Intermediate Users’ Rights, 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 67, 69-71 (1999); Laura G.
Lape, Transforming Fair Use: The Productive Use Factor in Fair Use Doctrine, 58 ALB. L. REV. 677,
720-21 (1995).
5. Consideration of whether it would be desirable for fair use to be more available in situations
in which the defendant has prepared a derivative work is beyond the scope of this Essay.
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right, will instead be judged as noninfringing fair uses.6 As Professor Paul
Goldstein’s treatise notes, “On principle, the rule [weighing transformativeness in
favor of fair use] threatens to undermine the balance that Congress struck in section
106(2)’s derivative rights provision to give copyright owners exclusive control over
transformative works to the extent these works borrow copyrightable expression
from the copyrighted work.”7
At least one recent district court decision highlights the potential interaction
between fair use transformativeness and the scope of the derivative work right and
seems to bear out commentators’ fears. Clean Flicks v. Soderbergh involved a
claim of infringement by motion picture copyright owners against businesses that
produced and rented DVD copies of popular movies that had been “altered by
deleting ‘sex, nudity, profanity and gory violence.’”8 The court explained how the
principal defendant produced its versions: “The editing techniques used include
redaction of audio content, replacing the redaction with ambient noise, ‘blending’
of audio and visual content to provide transition of edited scenes, cropping, fogging
or the use of a black bar to obscure visual content.”9
The copyright owners’ claims against the defendants included claims of
unauthorized preparation of derivative works—“the edited versions of their films,”
while the defendants argued that they had not produced derivative works.10 At the
same time, the defendants asserted that their activities were fair use—and argued
that the transformativeness of their use should weigh in favor of their fair use
claim, while the plaintiffs argued that the defendants’ edited versions were not
transformative for purposes of the first fair use factor.11
The district court, facing what it saw as the litigants’ “inconsistent positions,”
viewed the question of transformativeness as the same in the derivative work and
fair use contexts. In analyzing the first fair use factor, the court concluded “[t]here
is nothing transformative about the edited copies,” because the defendants “add
nothing new” to the movies and instead merely “delete scenes and dialogue.”12
The court then held that “because the infringing copies of these movies are not
used in a transformative manner, they are not derivative works and do not violate
§ 106(2).”13 Regardless of whether the court was correct that the defendant’s use
6. How much of a concern this should be depends in part on how much emphasis courts put on
transformativeness in reaching the ultimate conclusion on fair use. For many ordinary derivative works
(that is, works with no particular critical or commentary element in their transformation), courts might
well find that the unauthorized production of such works has a sufficiently negative effect on the wellestablished markets for producing such derivative works (such as cover recordings of musical
compositions, films based on novels, stage musicals based on films, etc.) that the overall weighing of the
statutory factors results in denying the fair use claim, even if the defendant has made a highly
transformative derivative work.
7. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, 2 GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT 12.49 (3d ed. 2005 & 2007 Supp.).
8. Clean Flicks of Colorado, LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1238 (D. Colo. 2006).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1240-41.
11. Id. at 1241.
12. Id. It is not clear that one cannot “add” some “new expression, meaning or message” within
the Campbell Court’s view of transformativeness by creative deletion of portions of a copyrighted work.
13. Id. at 1242 (emphasis added).
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was not transformative for fair use analysis or that it did not constitute the
preparation of a derivative work, its view that because a use is not transformative
under the first fair use factor it therefore is not a use that produced a derivative
work seems clearly incorrect.
A “sanitized” version of a film certainly might not be transformative for fair use
purposes, or might be only very weakly so, because bleeping certain words in the
film’s dialogue or using a black bar or blurring to obscure some nudity in certain
frames might, in some cases, not really add any new purpose, character, expression,
meaning or message to the film, or might only add the message (perhaps already
obvious from the unaltered film) that the movie contains some content that some
people find objectionable.14 At the same time, it seems possible that the edited
version, even if not transformative for fair use analysis, might well constitute a
derivative work, particularly if the amount of alteration of objectionable dialogue,
or of images of violence or nudity, is significant.15 After all, the definition of
derivative work specifically includes the categories of abridgement and
condensation, demonstrating that removing portions of a work (possibly with the
addition of only minimal material to tie the remaining portions together) can indeed
be a sufficient recasting, transforming, or adapting to result in the creation of a
derivative work.
The conclusion that, because the defendant’s editing of the plaintiff’s films was
not transformative for fair use analysis, the edited versions were therefore not
derivative works, thus seems to diminish the scope of the derivative work right.
Presumably, under the Clean Flicks view, determining whether someone has
prepared a derivative work might now involve not just deciding whether the work
that she has prepared meets the statutory definition of a derivative work, but also
deciding whether her use of the underlying work is “transformative” in the fair use
sense. Under this view, someone who, for example, prepares a sanitized version of
a public domain film would apparently not be entitled to a copyright in that new
version, regardless of the originality of her contributions to it, because such a
version does not constitute a derivative work, because it is not transformative as
that term is used in fair use analysis. This seems contrary to the general view of
what constitutes a derivative work.
B. CIRCUIT COURT TREATMENT OF TRANSFORMATIVENESS AND DERIVATIVE
WORKS
In order to explore whether the Clean Flicks approach is aberrational or reflects
a more generalized view, it is useful to survey the larger landscape of fair use
14. In addition, as discussed in Part II infra, to the extent that the transformativeness of the
defendant’s purpose is relevant, a court might well find that the sanitized versions did not have a
transformative purpose but instead were designed to entertain the viewer (albeit without some
potentially offensive content) in the same way as the original movie and by conveying essentially the
same expression.
15. Cf. Maljack Productions, Inc. v. UAV Corp., 964 F. Supp. 1416, 1426-28 (C.D.Cal 1997)
(finding pan-and-scan version of film a copyrightable derivative work), aff’d on other grounds sub nom.
Batjac Productions, Inc. v. Goodtimes Home Video, 160 F.3d 1223 (9th Cir. 1998).
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decisions. This Essay reviews all of the published circuit court opinions applying
the statutory fair use analysis between the Supreme Court’s decision in Campbell
and the end of 2007, and considers how those opinions dealt with the relationship
between transformativeness in fair use analysis and the scope of the derivative
work right. I identified 37 cases in this period, involving 41 published opinions, in
which circuit courts reviewed substantive fair use claims and offered some
discussion of the first statutory factor, or the derivative work right, or both.16 This
review indicates that, to date, at least appellate courts have not applied fair use
transformativeness in ways that significantly implicate the scope of the copyright
owner’s derivative work right.
1. Express Discussion of the Fair Use-Derivative Work Relationship
Only one appellate decision since Campbell has expressly addressed the
relationship between derivative works as works that have “transformed” the
expression in an underlying work and the “transformativeness” relevant to fair use
analysis.17 In Castle Rock Entertainment v. Carol Publishing Group, the
defendants had produced The Seinfeld Aptitude Test, a book of 643 trivia questions
testing the reader’s knowledge of the characters and events in the plaintiff’s popular
television sitcom.18 An extended trivia test based upon a television show would
seem to constitute a derivative work based on the show, and in concluding that the
trivia questions infringed the show’s copyright, the court implied, fairly strongly,
that Carol Publishing had violated the plaintiff’s section 106(2) right.19 In
reviewing the defendants’ fair use claim, the court’s discussion of
transformativeness focused almost entirely on its view that the defendants had not
used the plaintiff’s work for a transformative purpose (such as criticism,
commentary, parody, scholarship, teaching, or research), but had instead used it
merely for the same entertainment purpose for which the original TV episodes were
intended.20 The court concluded that the defendants’ book had “transformed
Seinfeld’s expression into trivia quiz book form with little, if any, transformative
16. I began with the list of circuit court cases after Campbell and through 2005 that Barton Beebe
identified in his excellent recent empirical survey as making substantial use of the Section 107 factors.
See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978-2005, 156 U. PENN.
L. REV. 549, 623 (2008). I then used Westlaw to update that list, using the same methodology described
by Beebe, through to the end of 2007. I eliminated any opinions that did not analyze a substantive fair
use claim, as well as any published opinions that were superseded by later published opinions in the
same case. I also eliminated one opinion that discussed the first factor, but only considered the
commercial nature of the work, and left the question of transformativeness unaddressed.
17. One other opinion considered the relationship between derivative works and fair use more
generally. See Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512 (7th Cir. 2002), discussed infra text
accompanying notes 39-44.
18. Castle Rock Ent’mt, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998).
19. Id. at 139 (finding support in Horgan v. Macmillian, Inc., 789 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1986), a case
involving derivative work claims); id. at 140 (noting that “total concept and feel” test for infringement is
unhelpful, and that “many ‘derivative’ works of different genres, in which copyright owners have
exclusive rights, see 17 U.S.C. § 106, may have a different total concept and feel from the original
work”).
20. Id. at 142-43.
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purpose” and weighed this factor against a finding of fair use.21
The court articulated a number of at least minimally creative expressive
elements that the defendants had contributed to their trivia quiz book, reinforcing
the view that that the defendants may have produced a derivative work.22 But the
court also immediately sought to clear up “a potential source of confusion in our
copyright jurisprudence over the use of the term ‘transformative,’” arising from the
fact that the definition of “derivative work” encompassed works that “transformed”
some underlying work.23 “Although derivative works that are subject to the
author’s copyright transform an original work into a new mode of presentation,
such works—unlike works of fair use—take expression for purposes that are not
‘transformative.’”24 The court thus appeared to expressly reject a view that any
transformation involved in the preparation of a derivative work would necessarily
count toward making that preparation a “transformative” use for purposes of fair
use analysis. The court clearly viewed fair-use transformativeness as distinct from
the transformation that produces a derivative work, and saw the former as focused
on the purpose of the use.
2. Defendants’ Uses that Involve a Derivative Work
a. Expressly Acknowledged Preparation of a Derivative Work
At least five cases are notable for the lack of any discussion of the relationship
between what constitutes a derivative work and what constitutes transformativeness
for fair use, despite the fact that the courts in those cases expressly found that a
defendant had prepared (or could be found to have prepared) a derivative work
based on the plaintiff’s copyrighted work. In each case, the court apparently did
not view the transformation wrought by the defendant in creating the derivative
work as even relevant to the analysis of whether the defendant’s use was
transformative for purposes of the first fair use factor, and certainly did not view
the preparation of the derivative work as itself constituting transformativeness that
weighed in favor of fair use.
In Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. v. Penguin Books, the defendants, in a book called
The Cat NOT in the Hat, told the story of the O.J. Simpson murder trial in the style
of the Dr. Seuss children’s classic The Cat in the Hat.25 Seuss claimed that the
defendants had infringed his derivative work right, and the work certainly seems to
be a classic example of a derivative work.26 The defendants took the main

21. Id. at 143.
22. The court recognized that creative expression was required to turn a “fact” depicted in the TV
show into question-and-answer form, to create incorrect multiple-choice answers, and to arrange the
questions into increasing levels of difficulty. Id. The court might also have pointed to the selection
involved in deciding which of the many occurrences in the 84 episodes from which the book drew
should be the basis for the questions.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997).
26. Id. at 1397.
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character from the copyrighted work and placed that character in a new setting in
order to tell a new story in a similar visual and literary style. The defendants’ book
was clearly based upon the Seuss work, and appears to have recast, transformed,
and adapted expression from it. The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s
decision that the plaintiff was likely to prevail on its prima facie infringement
claim. As to the issue of whether the use was transformative for fair use analysis,
the Ninth Circuit posed the question by reference to Campbell’s discussion of that
factor but limited its analysis entirely to whether the work was a parody of the
Seuss work or was instead a satire. Deciding that the defendants aimed any
commentary and criticism in their work not at Dr. Seuss or his works, and that
therefore the defendants had produced a satire and not a parody, the court
concluded that there was “no effort to create a transformative work with ‘new
expression, meaning, or message.’”27 In the Ninth Circuit’s view, the defendant
apparently had produced a derivative work, but whatever transformation of content
the defendant had engaged in was apparently not at all relevant to whether the
defendant’s use was “transformative” for purposes of the fair use analysis. As a
result, the court found that the first factor weighed against the fair use claim. The
defendant had clearly altered the content of the original work and offered a
different message, but the court concluded that these changes were not
“transformative” because they did not produce a parody.
In Micro Star v. FormGen Inc., the Ninth Circuit concluded that the
counterclaim plaintiff, the owner of the copyright in the videogame Duke Nukem

27. Id. at 1401. That conclusion seems to be far more nonsensical than the average Dr. Seuss
work, given that the court had just spent a page explaining how the defendants “broadly mimic Dr.
Seuss’ characteristic style” in order to “retell the Simpson tale” rather than “the substance and content of
The Cat in the Hat.” Id. Whatever the relative impact that parodic and satiric purpose have on fair use,
The Cat NOT in the Hat surely, in comparison to the Dr. Seuss original, “adds something new, with a
further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message,”
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579, and is therefore transformative to some degree under any fair reading of the
Campbell Court’s meaning of that term. Presumably then, this was in reality a case where the defendant
had prepared a derivative work and had used it for a transformative purpose, so that the court should
have found transformativeness. Perhaps the transformativeness of the satire would have weighed less
heavily in favor of fair use than if the work had been a parody, and the ultimate conclusion based on all
the factors might still have been that the use was unfair, but the court’s transformativeness analysis
seems to be a substantial misreading of Campbell. The decision simply gives transformativeness too
crabbed a reading.
I think that Diane Zimmerman’s explanation for this case (and others like it) makes sense. See Diane
Leenheer Zimmerman, The More Things Change, The Less They Seem “Transformed”: Some
Reflections on Fair Use, 46 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 251 (1998). She argued in 1998 that judges at
the time felt obliged to analyze a work’s transformativeness, and that a finding that a use was
transformative was difficult, in the wake of Campbell, to reconcile with an ultimate finding that the use
was not fair, so courts “engaged in so much twisting and turning to avoid the seemingly obvious
conclusion that, whatever else might have been troubling in the defendants’ cases, the uses in question
were at least ‘transformative’ [and] clearly did provide the public with a new or substantially reworked
product.” Id. at 259-60. See also Matthew D. Bunker, Eroding Fair Use: The “Transformative” Use
Doctrine After Campbell, 7 COMM. L. & POL’Y 1, 15 (2002) (“Because post-Campbell courts sometimes
seem to assume that a finding of transformativeness is the golden ring that leads to success on a fair use
claim, these courts often go to great lengths to deny the at least arguable transformativeness of works
before them.”).
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3D, was likely to prevail on the merits of its claim that defendant Micro Star’s
distribution of additional levels for use with the videogame infringed on
FormGen’s exclusive right to prepare derivative works based on its game.28 The
court ruled that the additional game levels told stories that were sequels to the story
FormGen told in the basic game, and that this infringed the derivative work right.29
In reviewing Micro Star’s fair use claim, however, the court discussed
transformativeness only in a single footnote, in which it concluded, with no further
analysis, that the additional game levels “can hardly be described as transformative;
anything but.”30 Although the court had engaged in extensive discussion of
whether the works distributed by Micro Star constituted unauthorized derivative
works, in discussing the transformativeness of Micro Star’s use, it never even
adverted to the transformation of the underlying work involved in preparing the
derivatives.
In Greenberg v. National Geographic Soc’y, the defendants used one plaintiff’s
copyrighted photograph of a diver, which had previously appeared on the cover of
defendant’s National Geographic magazine, in a computer animation that appeared
on a CD-ROM collection, The Complete National Geographic.31 The animation
was a 25-second sequence in which 10 magazine covers appeared, one at a time,
and then morphed into the next cover in the sequence.32 The court ruled that the
animated sequence constituted a derivative work based on the plaintiff’s
copyrighted photograph.33 In the very next paragraph, the court considered the
defendant’s fair use claim:
The use of the diver photograph far transcended a mere reprinting or borrowing of the
work. As explained above, it became an integral part of a larger, new collective work.
The use to which the diver photograph was put was clearly a transformative use. The
[animated s]equence reflects the transformation of the photograph as it is faded into
and out of the preceding and following photographs (after having turned the
horizontal diver onto a vertical axis). The [s]equence also integrates the visual
presentation with an audio presentation consisting of copyrightable music. The
resultant moving and morphing visual creation transcends a use that is fair within the
context of § 107.34

The court’s discussion gives no indication that the fact that the defendant had
prepared a derivative work meant that the issue of transformativeness in factor one
should weigh in favor of fair use. While the court recounted alterations the
defendant had made, it did not view those alterations as having produced
“transformativeness” that would favor a finding that the defendant’s derivative
work was a fair use. In fact, the court seems to have concluded, to the contrary,
that the transformation made by the defendant went beyond the level of
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Micro Star v. FormGen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1112.
Id. at 1113 n.6.
Greenberg v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 244 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 1269.
Id. at 1274.
Id. at 1274-75.
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transformativeness allowed under fair use, and seems to have weighed the
defendants’ transformation against, rather than in favor of, fair use.
Finally, in Mulcahy v. Cheetah Learning LLC, the court considered fair use in
the context of the plaintiff’s work.35 The plaintiff had created a test preparation
manual that incorporated material from a handbook published by the organization
that administered the test in question. When the plaintiff sued a competitor for
allegedly copying portions of the plaintiff’s manual in producing the competitor’s
own test preparation course materials, the court considered whether the plaintiff’s
manual was itself an unauthorized derivative work based on the testing
organization’s handbook, such that the copyright in the plaintiff’s manual would be
invalid.36 In a two-page discussion of the question, the court concluded that
genuine issues of fact existed, precluding a determination as a matter of law that the
plaintiff had not infringed on the testing organization’s derivative work right.37
The court then turned to the plaintiff’s claim that even if her manual was an
unauthorized derivative work based on the testing organization’s handbook, it did
not use any copyrighted material unlawfully (and thus the copyright in the manual
was not invalid) because any copying from the handbook was fair use. Despite the
fact that the court had to evaluate the fair use claim only because of the possibility
that the plaintiff had created an otherwise infringing derivative work, the court
never mentioned the issue of whether, and to what extent, the plaintiff’s use was
transformative, let alone consider whether any transformation by the plaintiff in
producing her derivative work was relevant (and if so, how) to the evaluation of
transformativeness.38 This hardly suggests a view in which any preparation of a
derivative work automatically counts as transformative under factor one, and
weighs in favor of fair use.
In one additional case involving a defendant who claimed fair use in the
production of a derivative work, the court considered the fair use claim without any
discussion of the first statutory factor or the transformativeness of the use. In Ty,
Inc. v. Publications International Ltd., the court reviewed whether the copyright
owner of Beanie Babies stuffed animals (copyrightable as sculptural works) was
entitled to summary judgment on its infringement claim against a defendant
publisher that had produced a series of books that included photographs of the
copyrighted toys.39 The defendant “concede[d] that photographs of Beanie Babies
are derivative works” within the scope of Ty’s section 106(2) right, but asserted

35. Mulcahy v. Cheetah Learning LLC, 386 F.3d 849 (8th Cir. 2004).
36. See 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000) (“[P]rotection for a work employing preexisting material in
which copyright subsists does not extend to any part of the work in which such material has been used
unlawfully.”). Although the court discusses the issue in terms of whether the plaintiff’s “copyright”
would be invalid, in fact, protection would still extend to all parts of the work that were original to
plaintiff and that did not unlawfully use the underlying copyrighted material.
37. Mulcahy, 386 F.3d at 852-54.
38. See id. at 854-55. The court’s discussion centered entirely on the fourth factor, which it
described as “undoubtedly the single most important element” (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.
v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985)), and concluded that genuine factual issues precluded a
decision as a matter of law that Mulcahy’s use was fair.
39. 292 F.3d 512 (7th Cir. 2002).
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that its use of the photos qualified as fair use.40
In analyzing the fair use claim, the court did not take into account any
transformation involved in producing the derivative photographs. This is perhaps
not surprising, since the court expressly chose not to analyze the fair use claim by
discussion of the statutory factors. Indeed, the opinion characterized the first factor
as “empty” (except for a preference for noncommercial educational use) and made
no reference to the Campbell Court’s emphasis on transformativeness. The court
did, at one point, glancingly characterize “transformative” use as discussed in
Campbell as equivalent to complementary, as opposed to substitutional, copying.41
In the court’s view, “copying that is complementary to the copyrighted work (in the
sense that nails are complements of hammers) is fair use, but copying that is a
substitute for the copyrighted work (in the sense that nails are substitutes for pegs
or screws), or for derivative works from the copyrighted work, is not fair use.”42 In
conceptualizing “transformative” copying as “complementary” copying, then, the
court took into account the fact that the copyright owner has the exclusive right to
prepare derivative works based on the copyrighted work, and extended the concept
of “substitutional” copying to derivatives as well as to originals. Thus, while the
court stated that photographs of Beanie Babies were not substitutes for the toys,
they are derivative works “for which there may be a separate demand” that the
copyright owner can exploit.43 Thus, the court did not seem to treat the mere fact
that the defendant had to some degree transformed the copyrighted works (at least
by taking two-dimensional photos of three-dimensional objects) as at all relevant to
determining whether the photos were fair use.44
In sum, in cases in which the court found that an alleged infringer had
violated—or could be found to have violated—the derivative work right, courts
showed no inclination to treat the transformation involved in the preparation of the
derivative work as “transformativeness” in analyzing the first fair use factor.45 This
suggests that, at least to date, circuit courts have not used Campbell’s view that
transformative uses are more entitled to fair use to contract the scope of the
copyright owner’s derivative work right by viewing derivative works as
necessarily, or even generally, transformative uses.

40. Id. at 515.
41. See id. at 518.
42. Id. at 517 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
43. Id. at 519.
44. Instead of focusing on the transformation of content by the defendant in producing the photos,
the court focused on how the defendant used the resulting photos. In essence, the court suggested that
what the defendant did with the photographs would determine whether fair use would excuse what it
viewed as the otherwise infringing preparation of the derivative works. If one of the defendant’s books
was merely “a collection of photographs of Beanie Babies,” the court suggested, that book would not
qualify as fair use. Id. at 519. On the other hand, if a book were a collectors’ guide to Beanie Babies—
which the court viewed as not coming within the copyright owner’s exclusive section 106(2) right—then
the use of the derivative photos might be fair, if it is necessary to produce a marketable collectors’ guide.
See id. at 520-21.
45. Indeed, the courts that articulated a conclusion as to the weight of the first factor in these
cases found that it weighed against, rather than for, fair use.
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b. Apparent Preparation of a Derivative Work
In two cases, defendants used copyrighted works in producing new works of a
type expressly listed in the statute as derivative works, although the courts never
expressly identified the defendants’ uses as violations of Section 106(2). In Nihon
Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Business Data, the defendant produced Englishlanguage “abstracts” of the plaintiff’s Japanese-language news stories.46 The court
characterized most of the abstracts as “direct, if not word-for-word, translations of
the Nikkei articles, edited only for clarity.”47 The statutory list of examples of
derivative works begins with “translation,” so the defendant’s abstracts would
certainly seem to qualify as derivative works. Similarly, in Zomba Enterprises,
Inc. v. Panorama Records, Inc., the defendant produced its own recordings of
musicians performing the plaintiff’s copyrighted musical works (to which
recordings the defendant also added the text of the plaintiff’s lyrics, in order to
make the recordings usable for karaoke), and “sound recording” is one of the
categories listed in the statutory definition of derivative works. 48
In each of these cases, however, even though the defendant’s use fell squarely
within a derivative work category, the court did not find that the transformation
involved in preparing the derivative work constituted transformativeness for fair
use analysis. In Nihon, the court said that the abstracts “are ‘not in the least
“transformative”’” and that the “direct translations . . . added almost nothing
new.”49 And in Zomba, the court noted that the defendant’s musicians “did not
change the words or music” and that “a facsimile recording of a copyrighted
composition adds nothing new to the original and accordingly has virtually no
transformative value.”50 Once again then, these cases indicate that courts do not
interpret “transformativeness” in the fair use analysis as encompassing any and all
transformation involved in the preparation of a derivative work. One can produce a
translation or a sound recording—paradigmatic examples of derivative works—and
still be found not to have made any “transformative” use that would weigh in favor
of fair use.
Two other cases involve defendants who fairly clearly created derivative works,
although the courts never expressly acknowledged that fact and their uses did not
fall into one of the categories named in the definition of derivative works. In
46. 166 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 1999).
47. Id. at 71.
48. 491 F.3d 574 (6th Cir. 2007).
49. 166 F.3d at 72 (quoting the district court opinion). The court concluded that the first factor
weighed “strongly” against fair use.
50. 491 F.3d at 582 (internal quotations omitted). The court found that the first factor weighed
against finding fair use. To the extent that the court’s view is premised on no change in words or music,
its conclusion that a sound recording adds nothing new to the underlying musical work seems to
undervalue the contributions of the recording’s musicians and vocalists, as anyone who has ever listened
to two different but faithful interpretations of the same musical work by different recording artists can
attest. To the extent that the court meant “a facsimile recording” to indicate that the defendant’s
recorded version of the plaintiff’s musical work was intended to sound, and succeeded in sounding, just
like someone else’s prior recorded version of that work, the court’s view that the recording added
nothing new seems somewhat more defensible.
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Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., the defendant’s work was Alice Randall’s
The Wind Done Gone (TWDG).51 Her novel was “a critique of [Gone With The
Wind’s] depiction of slavery and the Civil-War era American South” that borrowed
characters, scenes, dialog, and other elements from Margaret Mitchell’s novel in
order to, in part, retell the story from a critical vantage point.52 Although the court,
in determining that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed in establishing a prima
facie infringement of the copyright in Gone With The Wind (GWTW), never stated
whether the defendant violated the derivative work right (as opposed to only the
reproduction right), Randall’s novel seems highly likely to qualify as a derivative
work, just as other sequels to existing novels constitute derivative works, given that
she used Mitchell’s characters and settings to tell a “new story.”53 In considering
the defendant’s fair use claim, the court never expressly discussed The Wind Done
Gone’s status as a derivative work, but it offered the following evaluation of
transformativeness:
The issue of transformation is a double-edged sword in this case. On the one hand, the
story of [TWDG’s main character] Cynara and her perception of the events in TWDG
certainly adds new “expression, meaning, [and] message” to GWTW. From another
perspective, however, TWDG’s success as a pure work of fiction depends heavily on
copyrighted elements appropriated from GWTW to carry its own plot forward.54

The court’s language suggests that it did not necessarily view the mere
transformation of expression from the copyrighted work as qualifying the
defendant’s use as transformative. Indeed, while the court did find that the
transformativeness of Randall’s work weighed in favor of finding her use fair, that
conclusion rested almost entirely on TWDG’s critical, parodic attack on the
viewpoints expressed in Mitchell’s novel, and on the fact that Randall “fully
employed those conscripted elements from GWTW to make war against it.”55
Transformativeness, in the court’s view, rested not in the fact that Randall had
transformed the underlying work (and likely produced a derivative work), but in
how she transformed the original and what kind of derivative (a parodic critique)
she produced.
Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp. offers a very similar example. The
defendant, as part of a movie ad campaign, had meticulously recreated the
plaintiff’s photograph of a nude, pregnant Demi Moore, but had substituted the

51. 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).
52. Id. at 1259. The appeals court agreed with the district court’s characterization that
“particularly in its first half, TWDG is largely ‘an encapsulation of [GWTW] [that] exploit[s] its
copyrighted characters, story lines, and settings as the palette for the new story.’” Id. at 1267 (quoting
the district court opinion).
53. Id. at 1267. See also id. at 1270 (“Approximately the last half of TWDG tells a completely
new story that, although involving characters based on GWTW characters, features plot elements found
nowhere within the covers of GWTW.”).
54. Id. at 1269 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)).
55. Id. at 1270-71. Judge Marcus’s concurrence would have weighed the transformativeness of
the defendant’s work more decisively in favor of fair use, again based largely on the critical nature of
the work. See id. at 1280.
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mischievously smirking face of actor Leslie Nielsen.56 Again, the defendant’s
photograph seems likely to qualify as a derivative work, although the court never
discussed which right the new photo violated. And again, in evaluating
transformativeness under the first fair use factor, the court’s discussion focused
entirely on the critical and parodic nature of the ad, without any reference to the
defendant’s alterations of the original content except to the extent that those
alterations supported the view of the ad as a parodic comment.57 The court
concluded that the ad’s transformativeness caused the first factor to weigh
“significantly” toward fair use, and the court’s ultimate conclusion was that the use
was fair.
In sum, in the nine instances in which appellate courts considered a defendant’s
use that expressly or fairly clearly involved the preparation of a derivative work
based on the copyright owner’s original, no opinion suggested that the fact that the
defendant’s work was a derivative made the defendant’s use transformative for fair
use analysis. Indeed, in five of the nine cases, the courts found that the use was not
fair or that the defendant was not likely to prevail on the merits of its fair use claim
(and in the three of these five cases in which the court expressed a conclusion as to
the first fair-use factor, the court in all three cases found that the factor weighed
against fair use).58 In two cases, the court found a genuine issue of fact as to
whether the use was fair (expressing no view as to the first factor), and remanded
the case for further consideration, without suggesting that the defendant’s
preparation of a derivative work was relevant to the transformativeness analysis.59
Only in Suntrust and Leibovitz did the court find that the defendant’s derivative
work was a fair use and that the use was transformative, but that conclusion was
based in both cases principally on the critical, parodic nature of the use, and not
merely on the defendant’s act of transforming content from the underlying original.
3. Likely or Possible Preparation of Derivative Work
In twelve more cases, the defendant arguably had engaged in some
transformation of the content of the plaintiff’s work that might constitute the
preparation of a derivative work, though it is difficult to know for sure given the
uncertain scope and boundaries of the derivative work right. But in each case the
court never indicated whether it viewed the defendant as having prepared a
derivative work or instead having violated some other exclusive right. In none of
these cases did the court suggest in its fair use discussion that the defendant had
created a derivative work and that such creation was relevant to the question of
whether the defendant’s use was transformative.
56. 137 F.3d 109, 111-12 (2d Cir. 1998).
57. See id. at 114-15.
58. The court found the use not to be fair in Dr. Seuss, Micro Star, Nihon, Greenberg, and
Zomba, and expressly found that the first factor weighed against a finding of fair use in the first three.
59. Ty reversed the district court’s summary judgment that the use of the Beanie Babies photos
was not fair, and Mulcahy reversed the district court’s summary judgment that the plaintiff’s use of a
third-party’s work in producing the copyrighted work that she alleged the defendant had infringed was a
fair use.
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In nine of these cases, the defendant had taken only excerpts from the plaintiff’s
work and had incorporated those excerpts in the defendant’s own, larger work.60 In
five of these cases, the court found that the defendant’s use was, or was likely to be
fair. The uses included quotations from an unpublished novel included in an
unpublished scholarly article about the novel that was presented at an academic
conference, quotations from a group’s confidential training manual used to support
the analysis in a report arguing that the group used mind control techniques,
incorporation of a portion of a photographic fashion magazine ad in a collage
painting commenting on “the social and aesthetic consequences of mass media,”
the use of screen shots of scenes from the plaintiff’s videogame in the defendant’s
comparative advertisements for its emulator software, and the inclusion of “a
couple of seconds” from plaintiff’s copyrighted film of a news event in a montage
used as the introduction for a television news program.61 In discussing fair use
transformativeness, none of the cases mentioned whether the defendant had
produced a derivative work, and half of them gave no discussion of whether the
defendant had, in the court’s view, altered the content of the plaintiff’s work in any
way that could be considered transformative.62
In five of these “incorporated excerpt” cases, the court found that the
defendant’s use was not, or was not likely to be fair. These uses included
incorporating film, still photos, and music into a 16-hour video biography of Elvis
Presley; broadcasting 30 seconds of a 280-second film of a breaking news event as
part of a local newscast with voice-over commentary; making and showing a TV
sitcom episode with plaintiff’s copyrighted poster as set decoration in the
background, at least partly visible in at least nine shots for a total of only 27
seconds; reproducing substantial excerpts from scholarly works in compilations of
excerpts as student readers for use in university courses; and using a few seconds of

60. Although there are only nine of these cases, there are five findings of fair use and five
findings of no fair use, because one case considers two different uses by the defendant and determines
that one is fair and one is not. See L.A. News Serv. v. CBS Broad., Inc., 305 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 2002),
amended and superseded on other grounds by L.A. News Serv. v. CBS Broad., Inc., 313 F.3d 1093 (9th
Cir. 2002).
61. Sundeman v. Seajay Soc’y, Inc., 142 F.3d 194 (4th Cir. 1998); NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst.,
364 F.3d 471 (2d Cir. 2004); Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 248, 253 (2d Cir. 2006) (defendant Koons
“included in the painting only the legs and feet from the photograph, discarding the background of the
airplane cabin and the man’s lap on which the legs rest. Koons inverted the orientation of the legs so
that they dangle vertically downward above the other elements of [his painting] rather than slant upward
at a 45-degree angle as they appear in the photograph. He added a heel to one of the feet and modified
the photograph’s coloring.”); Sony Computer Entm’t Am. v. Bleem, 214 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2000); CBS
Broad., 305 F.3d at 929 (CourtTV “incorporated the brick-throwing footage into the introductory
montage for its show ‘Prime Time Justice,’ which used a stylized orange clock design superimposed
over a grainy, tinted, monochromatic video background. The background changed as the ‘hands’ of the
clock revolved; LANS’s copyrighted video was in the background for a couple of seconds, one 360°
sweep of the clock.”).
62. Only CBS Broadcasting and Blanch discuss how the defendants altered the content of the
plaintiff’s work, and the latter case, as discussed infra text accompanying notes 93-96, seems to mention
the changes in content primarily to support the court’s conclusion that the defendant’s purpose was
transformative. All the cases, however, discuss whether the purpose of the defendant’s use was
transformative, an issue considered infra Part II.
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plaintiff’s copyrighted film of an important news event as part of television ads
promoting the defendant TV network’s coverage of the trial of two people involved
in that event.63 Again, in discussing fair use transformativeness, none of the cases
mentioned whether the defendant had produced a derivative work. Three of the
cases indicate that the defendant made some alteration to the content of the
plaintiff’s work but that the alterations were merely “mechanical” or added nothing
new, and therefore were not transformative.64 The same is true of one additional
case in which the defendant made one or two excerpts (totaling two minutes) from
the plaintiff’s full-length feature films but did not incorporate those excerpts in a
larger work, and instead simply used the excerpts as a preview for the film; the
court stated that the defendant’s previews did not “add significantly to [the
plaintiff’s] original expression.”65
Two other cases involved uses, other than “incorporated excerpts,” that might
qualify as derivative works, though the courts never addressed that question
expressly in their opinions. The first case is On Davis v. The Gap, Inc., involving
the plaintiff’s copyrighted “nonfunctional jewelry worn over the eyes in the manner
of eyeglasses.”66 The defendant clothing store company produced an advertising
photograph of seven young people “standing in a loose V formation staring at the
camera with a sultry, pouty, provocative look,” with the central figure wearing the
plaintiff’s eyewear.67 Incorporating a three-dimensional sculptural work in an
artistic two-dimensional photograph may constitute a derivative work based on the
sculptural work, although the court never stated whether The Gap infringed the
plaintiff’s section 106(2) right. In denying The Gap’s fair use claim, the court also
did not mention the possibility that the use was in a derivative work, and found
“nothing transformative” about The Gap’s photograph because it showed the
plaintiff’s eyewear “being worn as eye jewelry in the manner it was made to be
worn.”68 The court made no mention of the new content of the photograph in
which the eyewear appeared.
In the final case, Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Productions, the defendant
63. Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Passport Video, 349 F.3d 622 (9th Cir. 2003); L.A. News Serv.
v. KCAL-TV Channel 9, 108 F.3d 1119, 1120, 1122 (9th Cir. 1997); Ringgold v. Black Entm’t
Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 73 (2d Cir. 1997); Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs.,
Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996); L.A. News Serv. v. CBS Broad., Inc., 305 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 2002),
amended and superseded on other grounds by L.A. News Serv. v. CBS Broad., Inc., 313 F.3d 1093 (9th
Cir. 2002).
64. Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1389; CBS Broad., 305 F.3d at 939; KCAL-TV Channel 9,
108 F.3d at 1122.
65. Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 342 F.3d 191 (3d Cir. 2003). See also
id. at 199 n.5 (“[I]t is not clear to us that the use of a copy—not accompanied by any creative expression
on the part of the copier—as an advertisement for the original would qualify as a type of use intended to
be recognized by the fair use doctrine.”).
Although the district court in the case had concluded that the defendant’s previews violated the
copyright owner’s derivative work right, the court did not reach the question of whether that conclusion
was correct, as other, uncontested violations of the copyright were sufficient to sustain the judgment. Id.
at 197.
66. 246 F.3d 152, 156 (2d Cir. 2001).
67. Id. at 157.
68. Id. at 174.
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produced 78 photos of Barbie dolls “in various absurd and often sexualized
positions.”69 Many of the photos altered the content of the copyrighted Barbie doll,
as they involved only parts of the doll (such as the “heads in a fondue pot” in
“Fondue a la Barbie”) or “obscured or omitted [parts of the doll] depending on the
angle at which the photos were taken and whether other objects obstructed a view”
of the doll.70 The opinion, however, never addressed the question of whether the
photos constituted derivative works of Mattel’s doll. The court though, did
conclude that the defendant’s use was transformative and that this
transformativeness weighed heavily in favor of fair use, and ultimately found that
the defendant’s use was fair.
The cases in which the defendant transformed the content of the plaintiff’s work
to some degree, and may have prepared a derivative work, thus present a mixed
picture as to transformativeness: in about half the opinions, the use was found
transformative, and in the other half it was not. The courts’ discussions of the
transformativeness factor in all of these cases, though, make clear that the courts
did not consider whether the defendant had prepared a derivative work as important
to evaluating the transformativeness of the defendant’s use in conducting the fair
use analysis.
4. Unlikely Preparation of Derivative Work
Finally, in thirteen cases, the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s work fairly
clearly did not involve the preparation of any derivative work. Indeed, these cases
involved little to no alteration of the content of the plaintiff’s work, but instead
involved basically verbatim copying, usually of the entire work. The uses included
photocopying of scientific journal articles, loading computer software into randomaccess memory in order to engage in computer service, making videocassette
copies of news broadcasts for distribution to news service subscribers, transmitting
live radio broadcasts over telephone lines, reprinting a religious tract in its entirety
for a breakaway sect’s use, reprinting a public figure’s modeling photos in
conjunction with a newspaper article on the controversy over the nudity in the
photos, exchanging digital files of recorded music over a peer-to-peer network,
posting online a municipality’s building code (which was identical to a privately
authored model code), photocopying an unpublished autobiographical manuscript
for submission as evidence in a child-custody dispute, producing smaller-scale and
reduced-resolution “thumbnail” versions of images appearing on Web sites for use
in operating an image search engine, and loading computer software on many more
computer hard drives than permitted under the terms of the software license.71
69. Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003).
70. Id. at 796, 804.
71. Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994); Triad Sys. Corp. v. Se.
Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1995); L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int’l, Ltd., 149 F.3d
987 (9th Cir. 1998); Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 1998); Worldwide Church
of God v. Phila. Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2000); Núñez v. Caribbean Int’l News
Corp., 235 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2000); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001);
BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2005); Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, 293 F.3d
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Not surprisingly, none of the opinions in these cases discusses the derivative
work right or any transformation by the defendant of the content of the plaintiff’s
work, and in nine of the cases, the defendant’s use was ruled not to be (or not likely
to be) fair.72 Perhaps more surprisingly, though, in four cases courts found a
defendant’s use transformative even though the defendant had clearly not created a
derivative work, and had not significantly changed, transformed or altered the
content of the plaintiff’s work in any way.
In Núñez v. Caribbean International News Corp., Núñez, a photographer, took
photos of Joyce Giraud, Miss Puerto Rico Universe 1997, for her modeling
portfolio.73 “Giraud was naked or nearly naked in at least one of the photos,”
which generated a good deal of controversy over whether that was appropriate.74
Defendant’s newspaper El Vocero published three of the photos to accompany
stories about the controversy, and Núñez sued for copyright infringement. The
newspaper printed the photos in their entirety, and although the court termed the
newspaper’s version “a relatively poor reproduction,” it seems clear that the paper’s
reproduction of the photos did not constitute a derivative work of Núñez’s
copyrighted photos.75 Nonetheless, in affirming a finding of fair use, the First
Circuit viewed El Vocero’s use as transformative.
In Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., the plaintiff sued the
defendant over the reproduction of seven concert posters among the over 2000
images included in a 480-page biography of the musical group the Grateful Dead,
which consisted of a chronological timeline tracing the history of the group.76 The
posters were reproduced in their entirety, and although they were reproduced at a
significantly reduced size (“less than 1/20 the size of the original”) and as part of
book pages that contained other images and text, this change in size and addition of
accompanying material would not generally be viewed as creating a derivative
work.77 The Second Circuit nonetheless affirmed the district court’s conclusion
that the defendant’s use was transformative.
Perhaps most famously in recent years, in Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp. and Perfect
10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, the Ninth Circuit held that producing thumbnail versions
of copyrighted images that appear on Web sites for the purpose of operating an
image search engine is transformative for fair use analysis. Producing a smallersized, reduced-resolution version of a copyrighted image by using an automated

791 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (not reaching the fair use issue); id. at 823-25 (Wiener, J., dissenting,
addressing fair use); Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385 (4th Cir. 2003); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d
811 (9th Cir. 2003); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007); Wall Data Inc.
v. L.A. County Sheriff’s Dept., 447 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 2006).
72. In Veeck, the majority found that the defendant had not infringed and so did not reach the fair
use claim; the dissenting opinion considered and rejected the fair use claim and would have found
liability for infringement. In Worldwide Church of God and in Texaco, a dissenting opinion in each case
would have found fair use.
73. 235 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2000).
74. Id. at 21.
75. Id. at 24-25.
76. Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006).
77. See, e.g., Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512 (7th Cir. 2002).

REESE FINAL V4

118

5/28/2008 8:00:39 PM

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS

[31:4

process is unlikely to constitute the preparation of a derivative work based upon the
image (as opposed to the reproduction of the image)—and it certainly would not to
the extent that some minimal creativity must be involved in the alterations made to
an underlying work in order to produce a derivative work.78 The Ninth Circuit
appears to have treated the search engine thumbnails as “making an exact copy” of
the copyrighted work, rather than as producing a derivative.79 Nonetheless, the
court viewed the creation of thumbnail versions as transformative.
In all four of these cases, the court concluded that the defendant’s use was
transformative (and, indeed, in each case the court ultimately concluded that the
defendant’s use was fair), and seemed entirely unconcerned that the defendant’s use
in each case did not transform the content of the plaintiff’s work sufficiently to
create a derivative work (if it transformed the content at all).80 As with the cases
discussed above in which the court found that the obvious derivative works created
by the defendant were nonetheless not transformative for fair use analysis, these
decisions strongly suggest that the circuit courts treat the question of
transformativeness for fair use as separate and distinct from the question of
transformation in the preparation of derivative works. The concern expressed by
commentators that considering transformativeness in fair use might affect the scope
of the derivative work right appears so far not to have materialized.
II. TRANSFORMATIVENESS: PURPOSE AND CONTENT
A. TWO TYPES OF TRANSFORMATIVENESS: TRANSFORMING A WORK’S
CONTENT AND USING A WORK FOR A TRANSFORMATIVE PURPOSE
The review of circuit court cases in Part I shows that courts do not weigh the
defendant’s preparation of a derivative work as necessarily constituting
transformativeness in the fair use analysis. Indeed, the cases generally do not seem
to consider the defendant’s transformation of the underlying work’s content at all in
the transformativeness inquiry. This should be reassuring to those who worry that
the Campbell Court’s emphasis on transformativeness might lead courts to find fair
use too quickly in instances of ordinary derivative works. (It may be less
comforting to those who might have looked to Campbell’s approach to rein in to
some degree what many view as an overly broad derivative works right.) But it
also seems a bit puzzling, since a defendant’s use that creates a derivative work
does generally involve some transformation of the underlying work’s content,
which would seem to be at least relevant to an evaluation of the degree to which the
defendant’s use is transformative.
A close reading of the appellate court fair use opinions that expressly address
transformativeness suggests why those courts, in evaluating fair use, generally

78. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com,
Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007).
79. Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1165 (citing Kelly, 336 F.3d at 818-19).
80. Bond v. Blum, discussed infra note 101 and text accompanying note 104, fits this category as
well, but that court never expressly discussed transformativeness in its opinion.
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disregard whether the defendant has created a derivative work. In assessing
transformativeness, the courts generally emphasize the transformativeness of the
defendant’s purpose in using the underlying work, rather than any transformation
(or lack thereof) by the defendant of the content of the underlying work.81
Transformativeness obviously could involve the extent to which the content of
the plaintiff’s copyrighted work has been transformed or altered. Campbell itself
involved a defendant’s use that had altered the plaintiff’s copyrighted original work
by changing much of both the lyrics and the music of the song. But
transformativeness, at least as considered by the courts, includes another aspect: the
use of a work for a completely different purpose than the purpose for which the
copyright owner produced or used the original work. As the Ninth Circuit has
stated, “even making an exact copy of a work may be transformative so long as the
copy serves a different function than the original work.”82 Again, the Campbell
case also appears to have involved this kind of transformativeness, since the
defendants there were borrowing from the underlying Orbison and Dees work for
the transformative purpose of parodic criticism, and not merely for the
entertainment purpose of the original.83
B. HOW COURTS EVALUATE THE TWO TYPES OF TRANSFORMATIVENESS
Though transformativeness for fair use analysis could involve both the purpose
for which the defendant is using the copyrighted work and the alterations that the
defendant has made to that work’s content, the circuit court cases suggest that it is
the former, rather than the latter, that really matters. Thirty four of the appellate
opinions, in 31 cases, expressly addressed transformativeness as part of the firstfactor analysis. In all of those opinions, when the court found that the defendant
had a transformative purpose for her use, the court found that the
transformativeness inquiry weighed in favor of fair use, regardless of whether the
court viewed the defendant as having transformed the actual content of the
plaintiff’s work in any way. Indeed, in all of the cases where transformativeness
was found based on the defendant’s transformative purpose, the opinion’s ultimate
conclusion was that the use was, or was likely to be, fair.
By contrast, in all of the opinions in which the court determined that the
defendant did not have a transformative purpose for her use (or in which the court’s

81. Judge Leval’s article, on which Campbell drew in its discussion of transformativeness,
implicitly recognized both types of transformativeness, noting that the use “must employ the quoted
matter in a different manner or for a different purpose from the original.” Pierre N. Leval, Toward a
Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (1990).
82. Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1165. See, e.g., Matthew D. Bunker, Transforming the News:
Copyright and Fair Use in News-Related Contexts, 52 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 309, 325 (2005)
(discussing “concept of ‘transformative purpose,’ which seems to consist of a different functional use of
the original work than that intended by its creator, rather than some sort of reconfiguration of the work
itself”).
83. I do not mean to suggest that these two types of transformativeness are the only relevant
possibilities for fair use analysis, but they do seem to capture most of the discussion in the caselaw so
far.
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determination about transformative purpose was uncertain), the court decided that
transformativeness did not weigh in favor of fair use, regardless of whether the
defendant did or did not alter the content of the plaintiff’s work within its four
corners. Again, in all of these cases, the opinion’s ultimate conclusion was that the
use was not, or was not likely to be, fair.
The following sections review these opinions in more detail, dividing them into
four categories, based on the basic possibilities that arise in any particular case
given the two different types of possible transformativeness:
1. The defendant has transformed the content of the plaintiff’s copyrighted work
and is using it for a transformative purpose.
2. The defendant has transformed the content of the plaintiff’s copyrighted work
but is not using it for a transformative purpose.
3. The defendant has not transformed the content of the plaintiff’s copyrighted
work but is using the copyrighted work for a transformative purpose.
4. The defendant has not transformed the content of the plaintiff’s copyrighted
work and is not using the copyrighted work for a transformative
purpose.84

C. “DOUBLE OR NOTHING” TRANSFORMATIVENESS
In the first category, since the defendant has engaged in both types of
transformation, we would expect a court generally to find that the defendant’s use
is transformative and that the transformativeness factor weighs in favor of the
defendant’s fair use claim (though how strongly it does so may vary depending on
how transformative the defendant’s use is). Blanch v. Koons is an example of this
situation. In that case, the defendant had in fact altered the copyrighted work by
copying only a portion of it, altering that portion, and incorporating that altered
portion into a larger work of the defendant’s own. But the Second Circuit’s
discussion of the transformativeness of the defendant’s use focused almost
exclusively on the transformative purpose of the use—using a fashion advertising
image “as fodder for … commentary on the social and aesthetic consequences of
mass media”—and only very secondarily on the actual transformation of the work
itself, which involved “changes of its colors, the background against which it is
portrayed, the medium, the size of the objects pictured, [and] the objects’ details.”85
As expected, the court found that the use was transformative and that this
transformativeness weighed in favor of fair use. At least seven other opinions
involved both types of transformation and led to the determination that the
transformativeness of the use weighed in favor of fair use.86

84. In this analysis, I am excluding cases in which it is unclear what the defendant had done with
respect to the content or the purpose, or unclear how the court viewed what the defendant had done.
85. Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 252-53 (2d Cir. 2006).
86. In Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 1998), the defendants
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In the fourth situation, since the defendant has not engaged in either type of
transformation, we would similarly expect a court generally to find that the
defendant’s use is not transformative and that the transformativeness factor, at the
least, does not weigh in favor of the defendant’s fair use claim.87 Infinity Broad.
Corp. v. Kirkwood is an example of this situation. The defendant there offered
subscription access by telephone line to live radio broadcasts in remote markets,
which it marketed for use by advertisers, talent scouts, and others in “auditioning
on-air talent, verifying the broadcast of commercials, and listening to a station’s
programming format and feel.”88 The defendant made no alteration to the
broadcasts themselves. And while the court acknowledged that the defendant’s use
of the broadcasts for “information” purposes was different from the copyright
owner’s use of them for “entertainment” purposes and that “the difference in
purpose tends to support Kirkwood’s fair use claim,” the court nevertheless
concluded that Kirkwood’s different purpose was not a transformative one, because
it involved “neither new expression, new meaning nor new message” and instead
the defendant “merely repackages or republishes the original.”89 Thus, in the
produced a copy, in “meticulous detail,” of plaintiff’s photograph of a pregnant Demi Moore but altered
the photograph to feature Leslie Nielsen’s face, clearly altering the content of the work. 137 F.3d at 11112. The court also viewed the defendant’s photo as having a transformative purpose of commenting
through parodic ridicule on the original. The court concluded that the use was transformative, and that
its transformativeness weighed in favor of fair use. Id at 114-15. In Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain
Productions, 353 F.3d 792, 796, 802-03 (9th Cir. 2003), involving 78 photos of Barbie dolls “in various
absurd and often sexualized positions,” the court found that the photographer had a transformative
purpose of parodying and commenting on Barbie and the “associations of beauty, wealth, and glamour”
that Mattel had cultivated for Barbie. The court found that transformativeness weighed heavily in favor
of fair use. See also Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001) (majority
and concurring opinions).
One opinion involved multiple uses, and found transformativeness for those uses that involved both
altered content and a transformative purpose. L.A. News Serv. v. CBS Broad., Inc., 305 F.3d 924, 93842 (9th Cir. 2002) (use of seconds of video news footage in introductory montage for TV show),
amended and superseded on other grounds by L.A. News Serv. v. CBS Broad., Inc., 313 F.3d 1093 (9th
Cir. 2002).
In two cases, the extent of alteration of content by the defendant was less, generally involving
excerpting portions of the work and including those portions as part of a larger new work that the
defendant created. In those cases as well, if the court found the use was for a transformative purpose, it
weighed the transformativeness factor in favor of fair use. In NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471
(2d Cir. 2004), the defendants created and published two reports that “analyze[d] and critique[d]” the
plaintiffs’ 265-page executive training seminar manual. “The reports quote sections of the manual in
support of their analyses and criticisms,” 364 F.3d at 475, thus transforming the content of the
copyrighted manual by selecting excerpts from it and embedding those excerpts into a critical analysis
of the copyrighted work. The court found that the defendants’ use of quotations “to support their critical
analyses of the seminars is transformative,” apparently because the defendants’ use was for the purpose
of criticism, comment, scholarship, or research, which was clearly a different purpose than that for
which the plaintiffs were using the manual. Id at 477. See also Sundeman v. Seajay Soc’y, Inc., 142
F.3d 194 (4th Cir. 1998) (quotations from an unpublished novel included in an unpublished scholarly
article about the novel that was presented at an academic conference).
87. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7, at 12:48 (noting “rule that the ‘ordinary’ or
‘nontransformative’ nature of copies should not weigh against fair use”) (emphasis added).
88. Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 965 F. Supp. 553, 555 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
89. Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting district court
and Leval, supra note 81, at 1111).
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court’s view, Kirkwood had neither transformed the content of the works it used
nor used them for a purpose that qualified as transformative. Not surprisingly, the
court found that Kirkwood’s use was not transformative and, in summing up the
first fair use factor, found that it leaned against a finding of fair use. At least eight
other opinions involved uses that the court viewed as involving neither alteration of
the content of the plaintiff’s work nor a transformative purpose. In all those
opinions (except for one dissenting opinion), the court found that the
transformativeness inquiry weighed against a finding of fair use and the court
ultimately found that the use was not, or was not likely to be, fair.90
In cases in which the defendant has engaged in both types of transformation or
in neither type, determining whether the defendant’s use is transformative in
evaluating the fair use claim seems likely to be relatively straightforward. After all,
it will for the most part be hard to find a use transformative if it involves no
transformation of either content or purpose, and hard to find a use not
transformative if it involves transformation of both. Many questions may remain as
to how strongly the transformativeness, or lack thereof, should weigh in favor or
against fair use, and as to the interaction of the court’s view of transformativeness
with the other factors in reaching an ultimate conclusion as to fair use. But these
types of cases will be the simplest in terms of determining whether the use is
transformative.
D. “EITHER-OR” TRANSFORMATION
The more interesting question is how courts deal with categories 2 and 3, in
which the defendant has made only one type of transformation.
1. Transformative Purpose Without Transformed Content
At least four decided cases offer examples of the situation described in category
3, in which the defendant appears to have used a copyrighted work without any
substantive alteration or transformation of its content, but in which the defendant’s
use was viewed by the court as being for a transformative purpose. These cases are
the four identified in Part I, in which the defendants did not prepare a derivative
work but the court nonetheless found that the use was transformative for fair use
purposes. In each case, the court’s conclusion as to transformativeness rested on its

90. Judge Brunetti’s dissent in Worldwide Church of God v. Philadelphia Church of God
disagrees with the majority on the ultimate ruling as to fair use, but does not clearly dispute the
characterization of the use as not transformative. He notes that a use “need not be transformative to
qualify as fair use” and that any alteration of the content by the defendant “would defeat [the
defendant’s] religious purpose because it believes that [the plaintiff’s work] is a divinely inspired text.”
227 F.3d 1110, 1123 (9th Cir. 2000) (Brunetti, J., dissenting); see also Am. Geophysical Union v.
Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994); Triad Sys. Corp. v. Se. Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir.
1995); L.A. News Service v. Reuters Television Int’l, Ltd., 149 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 1998); Worldwide
Church of God, 227 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2000) (majority opinion); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,
239 F.3d 1004; Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, 293 F.3d 791, 808 (5th Cir. 2002) (Wiener, J.,
dissenting); Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. County Sheriff’s Dept., 447 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 2006).
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view of the defendant’s transformative purpose, even in the absence of any
transformation of the content of the plaintiff’s work.
In Núñez, the First Circuit viewed the newspaper El Vocero’s use of the
modeling photos of Miss Puerto Rico Universe as transformative:
[P]laintiff’s photographs were originally intended to appear in modeling portfolios,
not in the newspaper; the former use, not the latter, motivated the creation of the
work. Thus, by using the photographs in conjunction with editorial commentary, El
Vocero did not merely “supersede[] the objects of the original creation[s],” but instead
used the works for “a further purpose,” giving them a new “meaning, or message.”
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579, 114 S.Ct. 1164. It is this transformation of the works into
news—and not the mere newsworthiness of the works themselves—that weighs in
favor of fair use under the first factor of § 107.91

The court’s transformativeness analysis focused on the defendant’s
transformative purpose. While the photos were taken and distributed as “a
publicity attempt to highlight Giraud’s abilities as a potential model,” the
newspaper used them for a different purpose—informing its readers about the
controversy over whether Miss Puerto Rico Universe had engaged in conduct
unbecoming her position.92 The court also discussed the fact that the newspaper
used the photos in conjunction with news articles about the controversy over the
photos themselves, in order to report and explain the news story, indicating that
reproducing an entire copyrighted work unchanged, in order to engage in
commentary, criticism, or news reporting about the copyrighted work, can be
transformative for fair use purposes, even though such use does not “transform” the
copyrighted work’s content.
In Bill Graham Archives, which involved the reproduction of seven concert
posters among the over 2000 images included in a 480-page biography of the
musical group the Grateful Dead, the posters were reproduced in their entirety
(although at significantly reduced size). The Second Circuit nonetheless concluded
that the use was transformative, explaining that
DK’s purpose in using the copyrighted images at issue in its biography of the Grateful
Dead is plainly different from the original purpose for which they were created.
Originally, each of BGA’s images fulfilled the dual purposes of artistic expression
and promotion [of live concerts] . . . In contrast, DK used each of BGA’s images as
historical artifacts to document and represent the actual occurrence of Grateful Dead
concert events featured on Illustrated Trip’s timeline.93

The court observed that in some cases, DK’s reproduction of a poster was
accompanied by commentary specifically relating to the poster’s image (just as the
reproduction in Núñez accompanied editorial commentary on the controversy over
the photos).94 But the court rejected a view that specific commentary or criticism
was necessary in order to render the use transformative. It concluded that even
91.
92.
93.
94.

Núñez v. Caribbean Int’l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 2000).
Id.
Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 609 (2d Cir. 2006).
Id. at 609-610 & n.3.

REESE FINAL V4

124

5/28/2008 8:00:39 PM

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS

[31:4

where “the link between image and text is less obvious . . . the images still serve as
historical artifacts graphically representing the fact of significant Grateful Dead
concert events” and that “both types of uses fulfill DK’s transformative purpose of
enhancing the biographical information in Illustrated Trip, a purpose separate and
distinct from the original artistic and promotional purpose for which the images
were created.”95 The court concluded that the defendant’s use was transformative
even when the copied images were “standing alone” and unaccompanied by
commentary, and that “DK was not required to discuss the artistic merits of the
images” in order for its use to be deemed transformative.96 Thus, the court
accepted that a defendant’s use can be transformative for fair use analysis even
when it involves no alteration within the work’s four corners and is not
accompanied by direct commentary on or criticism of the work, if the defendant’s
use is for a sufficiently different purpose than the plaintiff’s original use for the
work.
In Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp. and Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, the Ninth Circuit
viewed the creation of thumbnail versions for use in image search engines as
transformative because the defendant’s purpose in creating and displaying the
thumbnails was entirely “unrelated to any aesthetic purpose” for which the author
had created and used the image.97 The search engine’s use in each case “serves a
different function than [the copyright owner’s] use—improving access to
information on the internet versus artistic expression.”98 The search engine
companies “transform[ed] the image into a pointer directing a user to a source of
information,” which “provides an entirely new use for the original work.”99 The
court distinguished earlier cases finding that exact reproductions had not been
transformative because “the resulting use of the copyrighted work in those cases
was the same as the original use,” highlighting the very different purpose of the
defendant’s use in the search engine cases.100
In all of these cases, the defendant essentially used the plaintiff’s work without
substantive alteration within the four corners of the work itself, but because the
court viewed the use as for a transformative purpose, the court weighed the
transformativeness factor in favor of fair use (and ultimately concluded that the use
was indeed fair).101 Thus, a defendant’s use for a sufficiently transformative
95. Id. at 610.
96. Id. at 611.
97. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 818 (9th Cir. 2003); Perfect 10, Inc. v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007)
98. Kelly, 336 F.3d at 818-19; see also Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1165.
99. Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1165.
100. Kelly, 336 F.3d at 819.
101. Two other opinions follow this pattern. One is a dissent. Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco,
Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 935 (2d Cir. 1994) (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (concluding that use of verbatim
photocopies of articles in scientific journals for research purposes is transformative).
The other opinion, Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385 (4th Cir. 2003), involves the use of a verbatim copy
for a different purpose, but the court never discussed transformativeness in its fair use analysis. The
defendants introduced into evidence in a state child-custody case the plaintiff’s unpublished manuscript
Self-Portrait of a Patricide: How I Got Away with Murder, in order to demonstrate that the plaintiff’s
home was not suitable for children. The manuscript purported to be a true story, told in “horrific detail,”
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purpose can support a determination of transformativeness, even when the
defendant has not altered any of the work’s content.
It may seem surprising that courts sometimes find transformative purpose, and
therefore transformativeness that favors fair use, even when the defendant has made
no transformation of the content of the plaintiff’s work. The appellate cases
presenting this scenario, though, have so far all involved the defendant’s use of
copyrighted still images—the modeling portfolio photos in Núñez, the concert
posters in Bill Graham Archives, and the various photos located on the Web in
Kelly and Perfect 10. Still images seem like perhaps the hardest type of
copyrighted work to use for many transformative purposes without using the entire
image unaltered and unexcerpted. It is difficult in many instances to use only part
of an image—to make an abridgement or excerpt of it—and still convey the
message or meaning of the image in order to criticize it, comment on it, place it in
historical context, or index it for ease of location. At the least, it is often more
difficult than for other kinds of copyrighted works. For example, in Núñez, where
the newspaper printed three of the controversial photographs of Miss Puerto Rico
Universe in their entirety, the court noted that the newspaper “admittedly copied
the entire picture; however, to copy any less than that would have made the picture
useless to the story.”102 Because the controversy revolved around whether the
pictures were inappropriate for the subject’s position, it seems unlikely that the
reporting of views on that appropriateness could have been adequately illustrated
by using only cropped portions of the photos.103 On the other hand, if Miss Puerto
Rico Universe had appeared nude in a video, it would likely have been easy to
report on the controversy, and the claims about the video, by excerpting from it
only a single still frame, or perhaps a short clip. Similarly, in the case of search
engines, it is easy to convey to the searcher something about each ordinary search
result by quoting just a few relevant words of text from the Web page for each
result included on a search results page (as many search engines do). It is much
harder to show a similarly small portion of an image as part of the results for an
image search and convey any similarly meaningful information about the image to

of how the plaintiff had, when he was 17, murdered his father and “fooled” the authorities in order to
“get away scot-free” and collect money from his father’s estate. The defendants appear to have made
and introduced into evidence in the custody dispute an entire, unaltered copy of the manuscript, and the
plaintiff sued for copyright infringement. The court concluded that the defendants’ use was fair. While
it did not discuss the question of transformativeness, the court stressed that the defendants were using
the copyrighted manuscript for an entirely different purpose than the plaintiff’s purpose in writing (and
seeking to publish) the manuscript—“for the evidentiary value of its content insofar as it contains
admissions that Bond may have made against his interest when he bragged about his conduct in
murdering his father, in taking advantage of the juvenile justice system, and in benefiting from his
father’s estate.” 317 F.3d at 395. The use of the manuscript in the context of the custody dispute is
surely a use of an entirely different “purpose and character” and arguably one that alters the meaning or
the message of the work by placing it in a different context—one involving the light that the work’s
content sheds on the author’s fitness as a stepfather.
102. Núñez v. Caribbean Int’l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 24 (1st Cir. 2000).
103. The photos apparently would have generally been unavailable elsewhere to the public (unlike
a published book or movie), so that a reader could not have gone out and bought her own copy in order
to evaluate the criticisms and defenses.
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which the result refers. And certainly a short quotation or brief excerpt from a
magazine review of a Grateful Dead concert can convey some sense of the entire
review more easily than a reproduction of only a part of a concert poster could
convey a sense of the entire poster. In short, a single picture may be worth 1,000
words, but reproducing just one-tenth of a single picture typically conveys far less
of the original than does quoting 100 words of a 1,000-word composition.
Scenarios in which the use of entire textual works without alteration seems
likely to be transformative have arisen, though none has yet led to an appellate
court determination of transformativeness. Bond v. Blum involved copying an
entire unpublished autobiographical “true crime” memoir to introduce it into
evidence in a custody hearing on the fitness of the author’s household for the
children involved.104 The court found fair use but never discussed
transformativeness. And the recent district court opinion concerning the plagiarismdetection service Turnitin found that storing copies of entire student papers in a
database for comparison to other student-submitted work in order to identify
plagiarism was a transformative use because of the transformative purpose for
which the defendant used the entire student work.105 But for the most part, the
cases finding transformative purpose even in the absence of any transformation of
the content of the copyrighted work, may largely be limited to still images.106
2. Transforming Content Without Transformative Purpose
Finally, in at least 12 cases, a defendant altered the content of the copyrighted
work (or at least arguably had done so), but the defendant, at least in the court’s
view, was not (or arguably was not) using the content for any transformative
purpose.107
Perhaps the most striking example is the Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. v. Penguin
Books case, in which the defendants created The Cat NOT in the Hat about the O.J.
Simpson murder trial, using characters and elements from the famous children’s
book.108 The defendants had clearly altered Dr. Seuss’s original content quite
substantially. But because the Ninth Circuit concluded that the purpose of their use
was to produce a satire rather than a parody (and also concluded that only the latter,
not the former, constituted a transformative purpose), the transformativeness
inquiry weighed against fair use.

104. 317 F.3d 385 (4th Cir. 2003). See supra note 101.
105. A.V. v. iParadigms, LLC, __ F. Supp. 2d __, 2008 WL 728389 (E.D. Va. Mar. 11, 2008).
106. This would not be entirely unusual in copyright law. Much of the jurisprudence concerning
the standard of originality required in order for a derivative work to qualify for copyright protection has
emerged in cases involving derivative works of visual art (etchings, paintings, sculptural reproductions,
etc.), and it is possible to see the heightened standard of originality that seems to emerge from those
cases not as a general standard for all derivative works (such as translations, motion picture versions,
sound recordings, etc.), but as a standard that primarily governs derivative works of visual art. See
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7, at 2:220 to 2:222.
107. This section includes cases in which the court concluded that there was no transformative
purpose, even if that conclusion seems clearly incorrect on the facts as presented by the court.
108. 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997). See supra note 27.

REESE FINAL V4

2008]

5/28/2008 8:00:39 PM

TRANSFORMATIVENESS AND THE DERIVATIVE WORK RIGHT

127

Another example is Castle Rock Entertainment v. Carol Publishing Group, in
which the defendant produced The Seinfeld Aptitude Test trivia quiz book, which
required extracting information about characters and events from the television
show to use in creating trivia questions.109 In evaluating transformativeness, the
court concluded not only that “a secondary work need not necessarily transform the
original work’s expression to have a transformative purpose”—that is, that the
defendant need not alter the plaintiff’s content in order for the defendant’s use to be
transformative—but also that such transformation of a work’s expression was not
what mattered for fair use analysis. Instead, what the court was looking for in
evaluating transformativeness was whether the defendant used the work—
apparently in either altered or unaltered form—for a different purpose:
Any transformative purpose possessed by The SAT is slight to non-existent. We reject
the argument that The SAT was created to educate Seinfeld viewers or to criticize,
“expose,” or otherwise comment upon Seinfeld. The SAT’s purpose . . . is to repackage
Seinfeld to entertain Seinfeld viewers. . . . [W]e find scant reason to conclude that this
trivia quiz book seeks to educate, criticize, parody, comment, report upon, or research
Seinfeld, or otherwise serve a transformative purpose.110

The court concluded that the defendant’s book “has transformed Seinfeld’s
expression into trivia quiz book form with little, if any, transformative purpose.”111
The court appears to have concluded that for fair use analysis, a defendant’s work
will be “transformative” only if the defendant’s purpose is a transformative one,
regardless of whether the defendant has in fact transformed any of the expression in
the copyrighted work.
In these and the other ten cases where the court found no transformative purpose
even though the defendant had altered the content of the plaintiff’s work, the court
determined that the use was not transformative for fair use purposes, and, indeed, in
each case the court determined that the use was not, or was not likely to be, fair.112
The analysis and outcomes in the cases involving only one type of
transformation (either of content or purpose) suggests that in the fair use analysis,
the far more important type is transformation of the purpose for which the work is
used, rather than transformation of the work’s content. If the defendant has a

109. 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998).
110. Id. at 142-43.
111. Id. at 143.
112. See Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996);
Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 73 (2d Cir. 1997); Micro Star v. FormGen, Inc.,
154 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1998); L.A. News Serv. v. KCAL-TV Channel 9, 108 F.3d 1119, 1120, 1122
(9th Cir. 1997); On Davis v. The Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2001); L.A. News Serv. v. CBS
Broad., Inc., 305 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 2002) (use of film footage in ads for reporting on trial), amended
and superseded on other grounds by L.A. News Serv. v. CBS Broad., Inc., 313 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir.
2002); Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, 342 F.3d 191 (3d Cir. 2003); Zomba Enters.,
Inc. v. Panorama Records, Inc., 491 F.3d 574 (6th Cir. 2007). In at least two cases, the court’s
discussion of the first factor leaves it unclear whether the court views the defendant’s purpose as
transformative, and in those cases the court similarly found that the transformativeness inquiry weighed
against fair use. Greenberg v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 244 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir. 2001); Nihon Keizai
Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Business Data, 166 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 1999).
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transformative purpose, the court has generally found transformativeness, even if
she has not altered the work’s content in any way, while if the defendant has no
transformative purpose, the court has generally found no transformativeness, even
if she has transformed the content of the work sufficiently to create a derivative
work.
III. CONCLUSION
This review of the appellate cases decided since Campbell should provide a
better understanding of how appellate courts approach the question of
transformativeness in fair use. First, those courts clearly do not view the
preparation of a derivative work as necessarily transformative, such that the
preparation of a derivative work is necessarily more likely (given the favored status
of transformative uses) to constitute fair use. This should comfort those who have
worried that Campbell’s emphasis on transformativeness would inappropriately
interfere with copyright owners’ right to control ordinary derivative works. Second,
appellate courts also clearly do not view the preparation of a derivative work—or
any transformation or alteration of a work’s content—as necessary to a finding that
a defendant’s use is transformative. Instead, courts focus on whether the purpose
of the defendant’s use is transformative. This may offer some reassurance to those
who have worried that Campbell’s emphasis on transformativeness would
inappropriately limit fair uses only to those that involved derivative uses, excluding
those that involved unaltered reproductions of a copyrighted work.113
This descriptive review leaves unanswered many normative questions about the
nature and role of transformativeness in fair use analysis. Clarifying that the core
of the transformativeness inquiry, at least as currently deployed by the appellate
courts, concerns the purpose of the defendant’s use may help to focus courts and
commentators on more relevant normative questions. At the broadest level, the
courts’ practice raises the question of whether evaluating a defendant’s purpose for
transformativeness is the most appropriate approach to the “purpose and character”
factor, or to implementing the Campbell Court’s understanding of transformative
uses.
Even accepting the focus on purpose leaves many more specific questions
unanswered. For example, the transformativeness inquiry as framed here seems
inescapably comparative: the court must have a sense of the plaintiff’s purpose in
order to determine whether the defendant is using the work for a transformative
purpose. How should a court identify the purpose to which the defendant’s use is
to be compared? Is this the purpose that the author actually had in mind when
creating the work, or is it the purpose that a reasonable author creating this type of
work would have had in mind? (Courts have so far paid attention to such questions
primarily in the related context of determining whether a defendant’s use had a
parodic purpose.)114 How should courts deal with an author who has a multitude of
113. See, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech
and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535 (2004); Lape, supra note 4, at 722.
114. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 582 (1994) (identifying question as
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intended uses for her work? Furthermore, if an author, sometime after creating her
work, decides to put it to a different purpose, how is that relevant to the question of
transformativeness? What if she decides to put her work to that purpose only after
the defendant has already done so? And if the author transfers copyright in the
work to someone else, are the transferee’s purposes, if different from the author’s,
relevant? Questions might also arise as to how to properly identify the defendant’s
purpose, particularly when that defendant might have multiple purposes, or where
the use might satisfy multiple purposes, as the Campbell Court itself recognized in
acknowledging that “a work may contain both parodic and nonparodic
elements.”115
In addition to thinking about how to identify the plaintiff’s and defendant’s
purposes, more attention might also usefully be paid to the question of how to
determine which of a defendant’s purposes might be “transformative.” The Second
Circuit has said that a defendant’s use may not be transformative even when the
defendant uses the copyrighted work for a different purpose than that for which the
plaintiff uses it.116 That suggests that not all “different” purposes will be
“transformative” ones, but courts have offered little express guidance on how to
decide when a defendant’s different purpose is transformative.
Finally, understanding the purpose-based focus of the transformativeness
inquiry may also highlight questions about the interaction between that inquiry and
the analysis, under the fourth fair use factor, of the effect of a defendant’s use on
the “potential market” for the copyrighted work.117 If the defendant’s use is for a
transformative purpose, the use may reach a market that the copyright owner has
not yet entered but that could be a relevant “potential market” under the fourth
factor. And just as courts have recognized in the fourth factor that it would be
circular to identify market harm merely from the fact that the particular defendant
being sued did not pay the copyright owner for the particular use she made, courts
may need to find ways to avoid a similar circularity in judging transformativeness.
Courts should probably not conclude that a defendant’s use is not transformative
simply because the copyright owner herself might at some point use (or intend to
use) the work for the same purpose, but should probably also not conclude that a
defendant’s use must be transformative if the copyright owner has not yet exploited
her work for the same purpose.

“whether a parodic character may reasonably be perceived”); Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain
Productions, 353 F.3d 792, 801 (9th Cir. 2003) (rejecting survey evidence in determining whether work
has parodic character).
115. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 581.
116. Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir. 1998).
117. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).

